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Impressionism in Philosophy 
This talk is another part of the book project that I spoke about at last year’s Deleuze reading group 
conference. The book has the tentative title A Theology of Media: Error, Expenditure, Eschaton. Some version of 
this talk will appear in the eschaton section, which will deal with links between media and the possibility of 
apocalypse conceived of as revelation. Working from the Benjaminian idea the “now-time,” a present time 
imbued with a “weak apocalyptic power” derived from the our responsibility to past people’s failed struggles for 
justice, this section situates the ubiquity of media in contemporary experience as a proliferation of possible 
openings on to transformative truth. Every moment, Benjamin reminds us, is a gate through which the messiah 
may return. I see this statement to be taking on more rather than less force as our senorium becomes increasing 
saturated with messages, however vapid these messages may often be. 
The title for this talk listed in the program is “Spinoza’s Networked God,” and although the title 
doesn’t really work any more it does point to the genealogy of my thinking. Working on this media book while 
reading the Ethics, I got the idea that for people living now media starts to take on some of the ubiquity of 
Spinoza’s God-Substance. If anything is historically new in the mediascape we occupy, it is exactly this 
swarming ubiquity, the sense that it will not stay enframed on screens but looks to envelop us completely, just 
as Spinoza’s God cradles us in his immanence. Fantasies about purely digital ontologies began to emerge very 
early in the internet age. I guess the most spectacular example is the Matrix movies, whose real point is not, I 
think, Cartesian skepticism but rather a Spinozan sense of a fully immanent digital real. Anybody who has 
played any of the Assassin’s Creed games knows how interest they are in these possibilities. But there’s a funny 
tension between the notion of a fully coded world and Spinoza’s God-world.  
That tension is code itself.  We contemporary humans, those of us who live under capitalism at any 
rate, occupy a world in which every object hovers between its status as a material object and its capacity to 
dissolve into information, or rather to be information in its materiality. But Spinoza’s God has nothing to do 
with information. He does not communicate to humans the way the Biblical God does. He communicates, 
rather, as humans. Deleuze is very careful to say that there is no question of signlike mediation in Spinoza’s 
ontology. God makes no rhetorical appeal to humans—or so it seems at first glance. Our media world, on the 
other hand, makes nothing but appeals. As I look around the room I’m working in, I encounter endless appeals, 
from my laptop UI’s assiduous efforts to appear useful to me (there’s even a tiny image of my own face in the 
corner, as if to reassure me that I am the originator of these thoughts), to hundreds of book spines and covers, 
invariably accompanied by publishers’ names and emblems, to the “Ball Wide Mouth” mason jar containing my 
water, to the very design of the objects that utterly surround me—my clunky Dell laptop, complete with 
independent numeral-pad aside its ASCI keyboard, screams the joys of real estate, while the sleek iPad sitting 
to one side tells me that buttons are gauche. I mean to say that, unlike Spinoza’s God, media-ontology preserves 
the the agon of the mythic confrontation between divine and human. Something calls to me from almost every 
material object I see.  
Nothing could be further from Spinoza’s rigorously immanent ontology, where there is no space for 
the kind of lack that gives rise to an appeal. In fact, Deleuze places the refusal to put God face-to-face with 
humans at the heart of Spinoza’s ethical project: “The ethical conception has a fundamental critical aspect. 
Spinoza belongs to a great tradition: the practical task of philosophy consists in denouncing all myths, all 
mystifications, all ‘superstitions,’ whatever their origin” (270). This statement poses some obvious problems, 
problems that are bigger for Spinoza than for Deleuze: the terms that Spinoza uses are transparently mythical. 
The most important of these, obviously, is “God,” and next to that the notion that God “expresses” things. It 
seems to me that the entire project of the Ethics is to cordon off this expressive God from the myths that 
constitute him/it historically. It’s a lost cause, but Spinoza takes it very seriously, and it puts little hearts in 
Deleuze’s eyes. 
So there’s my staging of the problem. I am inclined to see Spinoza’s efforts to maintain the idea of an 
expressive God while eradicating the mythic aspect of that idea as somewhat desperate. I will attempt to 
reconstruct the key strategies that Deleuze’s Spinoza uses to effect this separation and try to point out some 
moments where the strain of that effort shows through. I take these as symptoms that at the end of the day the 
mythic is intrinsic to western reason, though I don’t expect to prove that to you this morning. 
Spinoza achieves the cordoning-off of God from myth by way of the distinction between attributes and 
propria of God. The distinction turns on expression, in which attributes play a decisive part and propria play 
none.  
 I won’t belabor the concept of attributes here, except to elaborate this one observation: Deleuze insists 
that attributes are verbs (104), by which he means that they are “no longer attributed to varying substances [as 
in Descartes, I assume], but instead attribute[e] something to a unique substance” (45). The function of 
attributes is, exactly, to attribute themselves. They attribute themselves, Spinoza claims, not across but in place of 
the gap between God and creatures (aka modes). The attribute attaches some “essence” on the one hand to God 
and on the other (possibly) to creatures. In its capacity as something “attributive,” the attribute “attribute[es] 
its essence to something that remains identical for all attributes, that is, to necessarily existing substance” (to 
God, in other words). On God’s side, the attribute attributes itself to God. One the modal side, what the 
attribute attributes, finally, is finitude. The attribute is a sort of valve between the finite and the infinite. It is, 
as Deleuze puts it, “’involved’ in the limits of finite” (46). The attribute is a consummately transitive verb. Its 
subject is the creature, whose finitude is the determined by the way it attributes the fullness of its attributes to 
substance. Its object, then, is substance, to whose total possession of the attribute the very existence of the 
creature testifies. Here’s why Spinoza’s rejection of analogic conceptions of God is so important to Deleuze. It 
is not the case that substance has attributes that modes have, only better: it has them in an entirely different 
way. In fact, the primary thing that differentiates substance from mode is this different way in which attributes 
open onto them: “Attributes are thus forms common to God, whose essence they constitute, and to modes or creatures 
which imply them essentially . . . The difference consists precisely in this, that modes are only comprehended 
under these forms, while God, on the other hand, is convertible with them” (47). Deleuze is trying hard to 
make a distinction here, but of course the only way that God is “convertible” with attributes is by way of 
attribution. 
 I take this operation, by the way, to be the same one that Adrian sees operating between “the life” and 
“a life,” which clues us in on some of the things that come along with being on the receiving end of the 
attribution of finitude: contingency, multiplicity, and duration. True to his admiration for Spinoza, Deleuze 
finds little space for the contingencies of material historicity in Expressionism in Philosophy, but in his historical 
survey of Neoplatonism he does remark that “one sees philosophers constantly threatened by the accusation of 
immanentism and pantheism, and constantly taking care to avoid, above all, such an accusation” (177). Deleuze 
crowns Spinoza the “prince of philosophy,” to recall Adrian’s talk again, because Spinoza “asserts immanence 
as a principle and frees expression from any subordination to emanative or exemplary causality. Expression itself 
no longer emanates, no longer resembles anything” (180). Heroic though he was, however, Spinoza clearly faced some 
of the same threats as the cowardly Neoplatonists who preceded him. The God he believed in was a God 
derived from and suffused with myth. If Spinoza was to fulfill the ethical demand that he rid his system of 
mythic elements, something would have to be done about all this mythical material at the very birthplace of 
God.  
His solution was to relegate everything about God that smacks of myth the realm of “propria.” Propria, 
unlike attributes, “do not constitute the nature of substance, but are predicated of what constitutes that nature. 
So they do not form the essence of Being, but only a modality of that essence as already formed . . . Propria are 
not properly speaking attributes, precisely because they are not expressive. Rather are they like ‘impressed 
notions,’ like characters imprinted, either in all attributes, or in some of them.” (50). They are not expressive, 
then, but impressive. And they really are, for it turns out that God’s rage and love, his gifts of liberation and his 
acts of retaliation, his flaming columns and his rulebooks, these are all propria. Spinoza delineates three 
“categories” of propria. The first are associated with attributes that God certainly has, but they misread God’s 
complete possession of these attributes as a particular quality. Omniscience, for instance, “is the proprium of 
thinking substance, that is, the infinite modality” of the attribute of thought. Really, the attribute has already 
attributed complete thinking to God and limited thinking to modes (aka humans). The propria “omniscient” is 
an inessential if correct characterization of God’s possession of the attribute. A second order of propria concern 
“God as cause, insofar as he acts or produces something: not as infinite, perfect, eternal, immutable, but as cause 
of all things, predestination, providence” (50). It seems to me that for Spinoza these propria are more aberrant 
than the first type. In fact, and this strikes me as telling, the propria are ranked in order of incorrectness from 
Spinoza’s point of view. But still, the fanciful notion that God “created” things as an act of will analogous to 
human will is a more or less harmless misperception.  
The third kind of propria are the ones that interest me. These “do not even belong to God: God as 
summum bonum, as compassionate, as just and charitable” (51). These propria assign God “a divine mouth and 
eyes, moral qualities and sublime passions, mountains and heavens. But even if we restrict ourselves to justice 
and charity, we arrive at nothing of God’s nature, nor of his operations as Cause. Adam, Abraham, and Moses 
were ignorant not only of the true divine attributes, but also of most of the propria of the first and second sort. 
God revealed himself to them under extrinsic denominations which served them as warnings, commandments, 
rules and models of life. More than ever, it must be said that this third kind of proprium is in no way 
expressive. They are not divine expressions, but notions impressed in the imagination to makes us obey and 
serve a God of whose nature we are ignorant” (51).  
Deleuze’s pithiest statement of the attribute/propria distinction is this: “it is only by human attributes 
(goodness, justice, charity, and so on) that God ‘communicates’ to human creatures the perfections they possess. 
It is, on the other hand, through his own attributes that God communicates to all creatures the power proper to 
each” (91). The scare quotes around that first “communicate” speak to the inauthenticity that haunts the 
propria. God communicates the propria that “do not even belong to” him to humans, apparently, by cloaking 
himself in myth and slumming it. Deleuze may rate impression much lower than expression, but he seems 
willing to admit here—or to have Spinoza admit—that God after all does impressions. He “impresses” these 
mythic notions in the imagination to “make us obey and serve” him.  This inauthenticity threatens to re-inject 
an element of myth back into Spinoza’s system. And not just one mythical element among many. The mythical 
element that arises out of Spinoza’s efforts to protect the divine from myth is the idea of an agon between God 
and humans—that is, the satanic element of the monotheistic myth. God revealed himself to the patriarchs 
deceptively, for purposes of rule. But the notion that these “impressions” cause us to “obey and serve” God seems 
to founder on Spinoza’s account of Adam’s error. Adam, “powerless to grasp the constitutive relations of 
things,” thinks God’s “explication” of the apple, his expression of it, that is, the very existence of the apple, is a 
moral commandment. But this misapprehension does not lead to Adam’s obeying God, obviously.  
Adam’s perception that he has been given a moral mandate in the form of an apple is responding to 
divine expression, just wrongly. Any response would be wrong, of course, since there has been no real appeal. 
The proper thing was just to observe the apple in its poisonous presence. To respond to a perceived message 
from God is to err, and the error is morality itself. God has no rules. But there is a will behind that moral 
reading. It is the same will that impressed the other patriarchs with various impressions—of a burning bush, for 
example. But God’s most impressive impression was as a law-giver, not least because at the end of the day it 
was an impression of Adam himself, the poor rube who stands at the starts of humans’ sad dependence on the 
idea that they might face God. Don’t even get me started on what happened to St. Paul when God pulled off the 
same impression later and once again sent the law careening off the rails. But really Adam wasn’t fooled. He 
was right to see a moral law coded in the material world. His mistake, really, was to take that law seriously 
enough to defy it, when the impressionist on the other side could always say that he was just doing his famous 
apple routine.    
Look, obviously Spinoza was in a tough position. He could not jettison the notion of God altogether, as 
did the tradition that followed him. If the whole notion of propria seems a little desperate and leads to certain 
absurdities, shouldn’t we just nod at that stuff and look at the ontological model that he actually meant to 
articulate? Maybe. But having worked all this out I find my glance drifting back toward the narrative of 
attribution. For all Spinoza’s insistence on univocity, it starts to get a little tempting to read attribution as an act 
of gatekeeping as much as it is an ontological machine. It guards the infinity of the divine against us finite 
modes. The flight from myth for which Deleuze crowns Spinoza doesn’t begin in the propria. It begins with 
attribution, whose function is withholding.  
It’s strange how much independence the modes start to take on late in Impressionism in Philosophy. 
Deleuze acknowledges that, though of course everything about modes is merely an expression of God, they do 
have some qualities of their own. One of these is duration: “an existing mode has duration, and . . . while it 
endures it is no longer simply contained in its attribute, just as its idea is no longer simply comprised in the idea 
of God. It is through duration . . . that existing modes have their strictly extrinsic individuation” (196). And, a 
bit later, Deleuze remarks that an existing mode is “no longer simply comprehended in God, but as having 
duration, as having a relation with certain extrinsically distinct time and place” (212-13). To the objection that 
this doesn’t sound like immanence, Deleuze that “the point is so obvious that it not detain us long” because the 
distinction involved is only modal: “extensive quantity belongs to an attribute no less than intensive quantity, 
but it is a strictly modal form of exteriority. It presents existing modes as external to the attribute, and as 
external to one another. It is nonetheless contained, along with all existing modes, in the attribute it modifies” 
(214). But this strikes me as a circular explanation. First Deleuze grants modes a certain independence on the 
basis of their unique qualities as modes—duration, for example, but also other things in which God cannot 
share, like contingency. Then he circumscribes this independence on the same grounds upon which he granted 
it—that the entities involved are modes.  
Duration doesn’t impress Deleuze. At the end of the day, it’s just another impression that God puts on 
while his real eternity sits backstage waiting for the rubes to drop dead, but not laughing. I can’t escape the 
impression that the one act that Spinoza’s God never got the knack of was the act of justice.   
That rolls us back to Benjamin and his famous “weak messianic power.” That power resides also in 
those sign-rich consumer products that cast their appeals nearly across our whole sensoriums. They were made 
by somebody, transported by somebody, sold by somebody, bought by somebody. All modes. Like an undertone, 
our appeals to one another ride the waves of data along with the ads and the memes and ethereal fragments of 
“news.” We’ll die in our millions before the time comes, but in the wild field of contingency we all generate 
while Deleuze and Spinoza and their inheritors look toward eternity, eventually, we’ll hear one another—and 
no prince’s impressions will make the slightest impression then.   
